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Technological innovation often results when the resources of a small firm are combined with
those of a large one. This is because small and large firms characteristically possess com-
plementary resources whose combination can facilitate innovation success. The possession of
complementary innovation-producing resources by small and large firms helps explain pat-
terns of interaction among firms in dynamic, technology-based industries. Propositions are
developed that outline how typical resources of small and large firms can be used to explain
industry-level phenomena surrounding technological change.
Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
The pursuit of innovation is often vital to achieving competitive advantage in dynamic,
technology-based industries (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Lynn, Morone & Paulson, 1996;
Porter, 1990, 1998). Goodman and Lawless (1994) suggest that firms can pursue innovation
using internal or external modes. A third, collaborative mode of innovation is also com-
monly employed (Kor & Mahoney, 2000). Firms will sometimes collaborate in the pursuit of
 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US government.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-703-588-7170; fax: +1-815-550-4984.
E-mail addresses: David.King@pentagon.af.mil (D.R. King), covin@indiana.edu (J.G. Covin),
hegarty@indiana.edu (W.H. Hegarty).
0149-2063/03/$ – see front matter. Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
doi:10.1016/S0149-2063(03)00026-6
590 D.R. King et al. / Journal of Management 2003 29(4) 589–606
innovation when the individual firms do not possess all of the necessary innovation-producing
resources. Resource complementarities of the individual firms are of particular importance
to innovation success when collaboration is the chosen innovation mode (Harrison, Hitt,
Hoskisson & Ireland, 2001).
Firm size may be a critical determinant in choosing an innovation mode. When two
or more firms are involved, Williamson (1975) hypothesized that an efficient approach to
innovation is having the initial product or technology development performed by small
firms, then having successful developments acquired by large firms for subsequent produc-
tion and marketing. However, Davidson (1991) criticized this external innovation approach
involving the acquisition of small firms by large firms because, though large firms can
acquire rapidly growing firms to increase their growth rate, the resulting firms are un-
likely to grow as fast as smaller, innovative firms that remain independent. Davidson’s
(1991) observations notwithstanding, it is plausible that small and large firms possess
complementary resources that are uniquely suited to facilitating the innovation process.
Still, how the resources of small and large firms are combined in collaborative inno-
vation within industries is a matter that has not received extensive treatment in the
literature.
In this paper, our goal is to develop a framework and related propositions that outline how
the unique resources of small and large firms can be used to explain firm behavior within
the industry-level technological change process. We build on prior insights from several re-
search streams including: alliances (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Parkhe, 1993),
control systems (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland & Harrison, 1991; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson
& Moesel, 1996; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992), dynamic capabilities (e.g., Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000), entrepreneurship (e.g., Covin, Prescott & Slevin, 1990; Schumpeter, 1934),
innovation (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Utterback & Afuah, 1995), mergers and
acquisitions (e.g., Capron, 1999; Gerpott, 1995; Pablo, 1994), and real options reasoning
(e.g., McGrath, 1999; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000). We focus on exploring the indepen-
dent roles of small and large firms within the industry-level technological change process
(Propositions 1 through 3) as well as on the reasons why small and large firms often col-
laborate (Propositions 4a and 4b), or, in the case of small firms, fail (Proposition 4c) at
particular stages of this process.
A three-stage process of industry-level technological change (Anderson & Tushman,
1990; Utterback & Afuah, 1995) frames our propositions for how small and large firms
independently and collaboratively contribute to technological innovation. Briefly, the cycle
begins with a technological discontinuity, or a significant, technology-based change in how
market needs are met. The second stage begins after a dominant design emerges, or when
product features do not vary and the design achieves a large market share (Utterback &
Afuah, 1995). The emergence of a dominant design represents a particularly significant
point in an industry’s life cycle. It is at this point that small and large firms pursue collab-
oration to further develop and appropriate rents from technological innovations. The third
stage of industry-level technological change represents a period of incremental change fo-
cused on marginal improvement in the efficiency or performance of the technology. The
technology life cycle begins anew with the introduction of another technological discon-
tinuity. Next, we briefly review the literature on the relationship between firm size and
innovation.
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Firm Size and Innovation
Innovation is defined as the invention and commercialization of new products or services
based on the application of technological and/or market knowledge (Hitt & Ireland, 2000).
The capability for innovation is scarce and may never be available in abundance (Berry &
Taggart, 1994). This capability is also valuable, and competitive advantage is commonly
achieved by firms proficient at innovation. As Chen and Hambrick (1995: 453) note: “a basic
understanding of how organizational size influences competitive behavior is of paramount
importance.” Given that technological innovation is key to competitive behavior in many
industries, it is not surprising that the effects of firm size on the innovation process are
generally viewed as worthy of consideration (Hamilton, 1985).
Still, the impact of firm size on innovation is poorly understood (Acs & Audretsch,
1988; Bittlingmayer, 1996) and, consequently, inconsistently depicted in the literature. This
inconsistency is reflected, for example, in Schumpeter’s seminal works (1934, 1942) that
identify the small entrepreneur (1934) and then big business (1942) as the major source of
innovation. As the following discussion shows, conflict between viewing small or large firms
as the primary source of innovation still exists. Our review is not intended to be exhaustive.
Rather, it is meant to show the variety of positions regarding firm size and innovation, and
to demonstrate a need for research clarifying this relationship.
A linear relationship between firm size and innovation is suggested in much of the liter-
ature, with small firms presented as having an innovation advantage by some authors (e.g.,
Freeman & Soete, 1997; Gilder, 1988; Kim, 1988; Rodgers, 1990; Rosen, 1991; Stringer,
2000), and large firms presented as having an innovation advantage by others (e.g., Cohen
& Klepper, 1992; Ferguson, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1978; Schnaars, 1994; Yearly, 1988).
The possibility of a non-linear relationship between firm size and technological innovation
rate is also reflected in the literature. For example, several authors have suggested that large
firm size confers an innovation advantage, however above a certain size threshold this ad-
vantage disappears (Baldwin & Scott, 1987; Kamien & Schwartz, 1982; Scherer, 1980).
The relationship between firm size and innovation rate has also been described as U-shaped,
with small and large firms being more innovative than medium-size firms (Pavitt, Robson
& Townsend, 1987).
Several authors have also noted that firm size has implications for particular stages of
the innovation process or for particular types of innovation. For example, Sen and Egelhoff
(2000) argue that small firms are better at producing radical innovations, while large firms are
better at producing incremental innovations. Scherer (1991) concluded that large firm size
often has a positive effect on the development of ideas, but a negative effect on the generation
of ideas. Moreover, small firms are considered the dominant source of innovation during the
earliest stage of a technology’s evolution, with the locus of innovation shifting to larger firms
in the transitional and more mature stages (Berry & Taggart, 1994). As a product matures,
manufacturing competence often becomes critical to business success as the primary basis
of competition characteristically shifts to cost and efficiency (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).
Such competence is most common among large firms that excel at process R&D (Klepper,
1996). Consistent with these points, Abernathy and Utterback (1988) describe small firms as
the principal source of product innovations and large firms as the principal source of process
innovations. As will be discussed later, organizational control systems theory and research
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(e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Goold & Campbell, 1987) and real options reasoning
(e.g., McGrath, 1999; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000) may also help explain relationships
between firm size and innovation within the stages of technological change.
Of particular importance to the current paper, the firm resources that characteristically
vary with firm size can have a significant impact on the technological change process and in-
novation outcomes. Roberts (1980) described large firms as having innovation-enhancing re-
source advantages in the areas of, for example, capital, distribution channels, and sales force
strength. Meanwhile, small firms possess innovation-enhancing resource advantages in the
areas of, for example, technological flexibility and entrepreneurial commitment (Roberts,
1980). Rothwell and Dodgson (1991) categorize the innovative advantages of large firms as
“material-based” and small firms as “behavioral.” We further develop insights on differences
in size-related innovative resources by suggesting that large and small firms characteristi-
cally possess complementary innovation-enhancing resources. These resource complemen-
tarities can invite collaboration between firms for innovation exploitation purposes. How
commonly firms rely on the resources of others to achieve competitive advantage is an issue
deserving additional research attention (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Nonetheless, it appears that
large and small firms often recognize complementary innovation resources in each other.
This recognition can help explain Acs and Audretsch’s (1988) finding that industries with
large firms are more innovative, but that the innovations come from small firms.
Complementary Resources and the Pursuit of Innovation
The challenges of large and small firms as producers of innovation are often vastly
different. Comparing the innovation-related characteristics of large and small firms reveals
that in many cases an innovative disadvantage of large firms is an innovative advantage for
small firms, and vice versa, which can make collaboration between two firms of different
size desirable for both parties. For example, small firms are often particularly responsive to
market changes (Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991), which can facilitate the ability of any potential
large firm partner to identify emerging markets and technologies that might otherwise
threaten the large firm’s existing business operations. Additionally, small companies are
more agile than larger companies. As such, collaboration between small and large firms
can make the larger firm less susceptible to an environmental mismatch and subsequent
organizational decline (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Bower & Christensen, 1993). Finally,
small firms tend to have entrepreneurial and organic management styles, characterized
by risk acceptance, adaptability, flexibility, and open communications (Covin, Prescott &
Slevin, 1990). Such qualities can help balance the effects of the bureaucratic and financial
controls typical of large firms and enable large firms that collaborate with smaller ones to
better recognize and exploit innovative opportunities.
Similarly, large firms can often compensate for the innovation-related disadvantages of
small firms based on, for example, their reputation and greater access to resources. Smaller
firms are often eager to cooperate in the pursuit of innovation with larger, established
companies because of name recognition and reputation spillover effects (Teece, 1986).
Large firms also commonly possess greater manufacturing, marketing, sales, distribution,
financial, and/or managerial resources that small firms may need as part of their efforts
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to exploit innovations (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). The following sections outline how the
resources of small and large firms may be used to predict their independent and collaborative
actions during the process of industry technological evolution.
Technological Discontinuities and the Behavior of Small and Large Firms
After a technological discontinuity, technology is largely experimental and its applica-
tions are often unclear. The new technology frequently does not work well and early designs
serve as market experiments. For example, the first personal computer, the Altair 8800, by
Microinstrumentation & Telemetry Systems (MITS), was introduced in 1975 as a kit of
blinking lights that could be assembled and crudely programmed with paper punch tape
(Carlton, 1998). As new technology matures it begins to displace the technology used in ex-
isting markets, such as when electronic calculators began to replace mechanical calculators
in the 1970s.
Large companies often surrender emerging markets to smaller firms as a consequence
of their characteristic responses to technological change (Christensen, 1997). In partic-
ular, large, established firms typically improve existing, older technology in response to
encroaching new technologies (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) and delay investment in new
technologies until their technical or economic viability is better assured (Courtney, Kirkland
& Viguerie, 1997). Technological discontinuities can render a large firm’s technology-based
resources obsolete, but leave non-technology-based resources in marketing and manufac-
turing unchanged. Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) suggest that firms with relative
strengths in marketing and manufacturing, typical of larger firms, often enter markets later
when technological uncertainty is resolved. Real options reasoning (McGrath, 1999) is key
to understanding why large firms may choose to delay investments in new technology. As-
suming that large firms have options to adopt new technology when uncertainty decreases,
it is rational for large firms to cede risky market experiments to small firms as a means of
coping with uncertainty.
Quite often, successful innovation requires allocating significant resources away from
clear current needs to ambiguous future-oriented needs. This resource allocation uncertainty
can result in a dilemma. On one hand, the resources invested in the pursuit of innovation
do not always lead to new product or service success. One estimate is that 46 percent of
R&D goes toward products that ultimately fail (Hudson, 1994). On the other hand, firms
that ignore the pressure to innovate risk technological obsolescence, loss of market share,
and potential financial failure. The result is that most firms, if they are to survive, must stay
on an innovation treadmill (Freeman & Soete, 1997; Porter, 1998).
Delays by large firms in pursuing new technology create opportunities for entrepreneurs
and are a contributing factor to Schumpeter’s (1934: 225–227) observation that small firms
appear in a “swarm-like” fashion to compete side-by-side with existing, large firms. Smaller
firms are less likely to be dissuaded by the uncertain growth prospects that accompany
many technological innovations (Christensen & Bower, 1996). Moreover, smaller firms
are more likely to rely on strategic controls—long-term and strategically relevant criteria
used to evaluate firm performance (Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson, 1999)—that can facilitate
the generation of technological innovations (Hitt et al., 1996; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992).
Succinctly, the following relationships are proposed:
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Proposition 1a: Large firms, in comparison to small firms, are more likely to focus
on existing technology and delay investment in new technology following a technological
discontinuity.
Proposition 1b: Small firms, in comparison to large firms, are more likely to develop
new technology following a technological discontinuity.
For a variety of reasons, small firms may be more likely than large ones to embrace
externally originating innovations that represent or follow technological discontinuities.
Research by Christensen and Bower (1996) suggests that the majority of technological dis-
continuities may originate in large firms. However, Christensen and Bower (1996) also note
that large firms often pass on developing new technologies that threaten current technologies
or whose value is uncertain. Cooper and Schendel (1976) found that small firms are typically
responsible for developing and championing the technological innovations that eventually
become industry standards. An example of a (formerly) small firm that championed an
innovation developed by a large firm is Apple Computer. In particular, Apple Computer de-
veloped the graphical interface for its Macintosh computer based on an invention of Xerox
Corporation’s Palo Alto Research Center (Carlton, 1998).
Small firms typically spot emerging trends and product opportunities before large firms
(Schnaars, 1994), and the former may have an advantage in accessing external technology
from government organizations, public or private universities, or other organizations that
perform research (Audretsch, 1999; Freeman & Soete, 1997). The advantage of small firms
in exploiting external R&D can be viewed as the result of personnel mobility where peo-
ple joining or founding new firms help to diffuse technology (Goodman & Lawless, 1994;
Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson, 1999). For example, small firms receive more technology-based
spillovers from universities than do large firms (Acs, Audretsch & Feldman, 1994; Audretsch,
Weigand & Weigand, 2000). Stanford University provides multiple examples of firms
founded out of a university, including: Cisco Systems, Hewlett-Packard, Logitech, Silicon
Graphics, Sun Microsystems, and Yahoo (Hamilton & Himmelstein, 1997). Another source
of technology-based spillovers is founders of entrepreneurial firms leaving established tech-
nology intensive firms (Porter, 1990). Large firms may exhibit agency problems where em-
ployees with new ideas have incentives to externally appropriate the value of their knowledge
(Williamson, 1975). In other words, an employee may obtain greater financial rewards by
joining or founding an entrepreneurial firm than by remaining an employee of a large firm.
In summary, rapid change in technology generates opportunities for firms to appropriate
external technology, and small firms may be better positioned and/or more inclined than
large firms to pursue these opportunities. Therefore, the following relationship is proposed:
Proposition 2: Small firms, in comparison to large firms, are more likely to incorporate
external technology following a technological discontinuity.
Advances in technology often take place within a given industry, and the introduction of
new technologies does not, by definition, create new industries. The shift from mechanical to
electric typewriters, for example, did not significantly alter the composition of the typewriter
industry (Cooper & Smith, 1992). Industries are created when a new group of firms emerge
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offering similar products to satisfy a latent market. Nonetheless, new technology can also
lead to the creation of new industries.
Small firms, in comparison to large firms, will be more likely to introduce new technolo-
gies that create new industries because small firms will be more likely to pursue technolog-
ical innovations that have limited or uncertain initial appeal in their product applications
(Christensen & Bower, 1996; Cooper & Schendel, 1976). The products incorporating these
novel technologies are, in essence, market experiments that, if successful, will induce the
entry of other firms into the newly recognized and validated product-market arena, thus
precipitating the emergence of a new industry. Of key importance here, large firms will
often overlook novel technologies that appeal to small firms because the former will need
the promise of greater returns to justify the pursuit of small markets or market experiments
(Christensen, 1997). By the time the new technology is validated in the eyes of large firms
that may or may not have had an early interest in the technology, a new industry will often
have formed around the emerging technology championed by the small firm (Zahra, Nash &
Bickford, 1995). The aforementioned example of the personal computer industry following
the technological lead of MITS is consistent with this argument. In short, the following
relationship is proposed:
Proposition 3: Small firms, in comparison to large firms, are more likely to develop new
technologies that result in the creation of new industries.
Dominant Design and Interfirm Collaboration
The preceding propositions recognize the important role small firms play in advancing
industry-level technological innovation. However, as small, entrepreneurial firms grow they
often become aware of resource shortcomings that limit their ability to appropriate rents
from the technological innovations and associated market niches they have embraced. This
shift represents a significant point in an industry’s life cycle where small firms begin to
seek out potential collaborators with the complementary resources they need. At the same
time, technology uncertainty is reduced and large firms seek partners in new technological
arenas increasingly recognized as viable. This is most likely to occur as the technological
innovation “matures” and a small firm finds itself with the dominant design.
Utterback and Abernathty (1975) identified the emergence of a dominant design, or
the broad acceptance of certain “standard” technological or product attributes, as a key
event in the evolution of an industry. Further, Teece (2000) identified the emergence of
a dominant design as a signal of rapid growth where complementary resources become
critical to innovation success. As competition coalesces around a dominant design, access
to resources traditionally associated with large firms (e.g., distribution channels, specialized
manufacturing, and marketing) becomes critical to firm performance (Teece, 1986, 2000).
Large firms by virtue of their size, scope, and reputation may advance a dominant design
simply by choosing to adopt a particular technology (Teece, 2000). For example, when IBM
introduced its personal computer (PC) in 1981, it helped set the Intel microprocessor and
Microsoft DOS standard (Lawless & Anderson, 1996).
A dominant design also brings new competitive pressures as the focus of competition
shifts. Small firms have been competing for acceptance of their technology and large
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firms have either focused on older technology or waited for decreased technological un-
certainty. The result is an increase in the need to collaborate for innovation exploitation
purposes. Small firms are more willing to collaborate with larger firms that can quickly
provide non-technology-based resources they need to adequately serve a market. At the
same time, after the emergence of a dominant design, and consistent with real options
reasoning (McGrath, 1999), large firms are more willing to invest in a proven technology
and market. Additionally, the large, established companies are more likely to be compe-
tent at the process innovation now required to lower costs (Utterback & Afuah, 1995).
The significant factor is that the relative needs of small and large firms now complement
each other, or exhibit a balanced asymmetry (i.e., where the resource strengths of one
firm are the resource deficiencies of another) such that collaboration is viewed as mutually
desirable.
Research on control systems also explains why technological progress is often contin-
gent upon small and large firm collaborations. As a generalization, small firms are likely
to emphasize strategic controls designed to assess and guide firm-level strategic actions
(see, for example, Goold & Campbell, 1987), whereas large firms are likely to emphasize
bureaucratic and financial controls designed to assess and guide individual behaviors, or-
ganizational processes, and financial outcomes (see, for example, Baysinger & Hoskisson,
1989). Strategic controls are commonly associated with increased R&D spending and more
frequent product introductions (Hitt et al., 1996; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992). Financial
controls are commonly associated with risk aversion, decreased R&D spending, and a focus
on efficiency (Hitt et al., 1991; Loescher, 1984). Importantly, industry-level technological
advancement requires both types of controls. Strategic controls can induce the technological
innovations most commonly associated with the first stage of the technological change pro-
cess, and financial controls can enable firms to more efficiently employ and/or marginally
improve those innovations during the third stage of technological change (Mezias & Glynn,
1993). This is because innovation is both path- and time-dependent, and the likelihood of a
technological discontinuity is lowest immediately after one has occurred. Thus, small and
large firms are both likely to excel at particular stages of the industry-level technological
change process based, in part, on the control systems they are likely to embrace. In short,
control systems theory and research help explain small and large firm innovative behavior,
and provide the general motivation behind their collaborative efforts to appropriate rents
from technological innovations.
The more specific motivations for collaboration between large and small firms fol-
lowing the emergence of a dominant design are many. Collaboration with small firms
provides large firms faster entry into markets and faster access to technology resources
than would be possible through internal development (Bittlingmayer, 1996; Gerpott, 1995;
Hadegdoorn, 1993; Kogut, 1991). Additionally, large firms may view collaboration with
small firms that have technologies of known desirability as a means to protect estab-
lished brand equity and avoid implicitly endorsing new technologies of questionable value
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). Collaboration with large firms offers small firms ac-
cess to needed managerial, financial, and marketing resources (MacDonald, 1985). Small
firms may also view collaboration with large firms as signaling enhanced legitimacy of
their product (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1988), or offering access to market power
(Hadegdoorn, 1993). Although collaborative activities go beyond alliances and acquisition
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(e.g., licensing), we limit our discussion of small firm–large firm collaboration to these two
options.
Alliances, or cooperative arrangements between two or more organizations for specific
strategic ends, are normally designed to supplement the weak functions of one’s own or-
ganization (e.g., technology, manufacturing, distribution, or marketing) through leveraging
the strong functions of collaborators. Complementary resources between firms will of-
ten motivate vertical alliances, where firm operations emphasize different stages of the
value chain and, as such, exhibit resource profile differences (e.g., to have its innovative
output efficiently produced, an R&D design firm forms an alliance with a large manufac-
turer of electronic equipment). The presence of complementary resources in prospective
alliance partners may also partially motivate horizontal alliances, where firm operations
emphasize the same stage of the value chain and exhibit resource profile similarities (e.g.,
two computer software companies form an alliance to develop a new operating system).
However, in the case of horizontal alliances, factors other than resource complementarity
are also likely to come into play as strong motivators of the collaboration. For example,
firms may form horizontal alliances thereby combining their resources to reach some min-
imum efficient scale, or to reap economies of scale. Moreover, if a positive correlation
exists between market share and firm profitability in the industry in which two firms at
the same value chain stage operate, then alliances may be more likely regardless of how
similar the firms’ resource profiles are. In short, access to complementary resources may
be of interest to potential partners in both vertical and horizontal alliances. In the case of
vertical alliances, the complementarity of the potential collaborators’ resources—that is,
how well one collaborator’s strength offsets another’s weakness—will likely be of obvious
and, perhaps, principal interest to the firms. However, in the case of horizontal alliances,
finding alliance partners with needed resources will be of primary concern to potential
collaborators, and these needed resources may augment as much as complement those of
collaborators.
Alliances between small and large firms for innovation exploitation purposes are likely
to be equity-based, for two reasons. First, financial resources are often part of the comple-
mentary resource set provided by large technology-based firms to smaller technology-based
firms with whom they enter into alliances. Small firms with promising technologies often
need financial resources to further develop those technologies. The ability of these firms
to obtain external financing is limited due to information asymmetries that make special-
ized technology resources valuable, but also difficult to appraise and resell (Zahra, 1996).
Large firms with technological competencies similar to those of prospective small firm al-
liance partners may be well positioned to judge the value of the small firm’s technology
resources due to the firms’ overlapping technological knowledge (Hitt, Harrison & Ireland,
2001). As such, large technology-based firms often provide financial resources to small
technology-based firms and in doing so acquire an ownership or equity stake in the smaller
firm. Second, a firm needing resources from another may want its alliance partner to have
a vested interest to reduce agency costs. When a large firm takes an equity position in a
smaller firm, for example, it immediately acquires a vested interest in the welfare of the
smaller firm, which will likely suit the (other) small firm shareholders. Moreover, since the
resources small technology-based firms need from their larger firm alliance partners are
likely to go beyond financial resources, equity-based alliances that align firm interests may
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be sought to promote the full sharing of needed resources between the alliance partners.
Still, there is nothing about the resource needs of small and large firm alliance partners that
demands their collaborations will be equity-based.
Alliances—whether vertical, horizontal, equity-based, or non-equity-based—can offer
both large and small firms a way to reduce costs and provide access to relevant non-resident
expertise (Sharma, 1999). Under conditions of globalization and rapid technological ad-
vancement, alliances represent an increasingly important strategy for firms (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996; Parkhe, 1993), and a growing number of alliances are between large
and small firms (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). According to Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1996),
alliances are more likely if the prospective collaborators (1) are in vulnerable strategic posi-
tions; (2) both have and need strategically relevant resources; and (3) operate in stabilizing
markets. Notably, these three conditions characterize the situation between small firms with
valuable technology-based resources and large firms with valuable non-technology-based
resources following the emergence of a dominant design. Therefore, the following relation-
ship is proposed:
Proposition 4a: Alliances between small and large firms increase after the emergence
of a new dominant design.
If the benefits of collaboration in the pursuit of innovation cannot be achieved through
alliances, firms may resort to mergers or acquisitions. Alliances will generally require less
strategic and financial commitment to one’s collaborative partner than will acquisitions
or mergers. Therefore, alliances are often perceived as the least risky of the collaborative
options. However, the effective use of alliances may be precluded by, for example, market
defects resulting from the existence of intellectual property protection (e.g., patents) or
the tacit nature of the information involved (Teece, 1986). Moreover, Teece (1982, 1986)
argues that complementary resources that are specialized expose contractual relationships,
such as alliances, to hazards where the parties may have to commit irreversible investments
that become worthless if the relationship breaks down. When they occur, breakdowns in
contractual relationships may require that the transactions be internalized within single
firms through mergers or acquisitions (Williamson, 1975). Additionally, acquisitions, rel-
ative to alliances, offer greater control over (formerly) external resources (Haspeslagh &
Jemison, 1991), as well as faster and more complete access to those resources (Das & Teng,
1998).
As a collaborative option for firms, acquisitions are a well-recognized strategic tool for
sustaining or increasing innovative output (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Stringer, 2000) with
large firms often acquiring smaller firms (Pablo, 1994). Acquisition is the collaborative
option chosen by many large firms because it can provide, for example, increased speed
of entry into new technological and/or product-market domains, lower cost of entry into
those domains (than would be likely through internal, organic growth), and exposure to
superior resources (e.g., technological competence) that might not be replicable through
internal development (Capron, 1999; Lowe & Taylor, 1998; Roberts & Berry, 1985). The
complementary resource-based rationale for collaboration between small and large firms
for the purposes of exploiting technological innovations remains the same for acquisitions
as for alliances. Therefore, the following relationship is proposed:
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Proposition 4b: Acquisition activity between small and large firms increases after the
emergence of a new dominant design.
Singh (1997) found that increased industry technology complexity corresponds with
higher rates of business failure. After the emergence of a dominant design, the failure rate
among small firms that incubate new technologies may be particularly high as a function
of two factors. First, many of these firms will not be able to build or gain access to the
non-technology-based resources needed to fully obtain rents associated with their techno-
logical innovations. Second, many of these firms will be pursuing technologies that fall
outside the dominant design, and the natural selection process imposed by market forces
will cause their demise (Tegarden, Hatfield & Echols, 1999). The impact of natural selection
accounts for the observation that the more firms entering a given market, the greater the
chances that surviving firms will be highly competent (Utterback & Afuah, 1995).
Contributing to the aforementioned natural selection effects, small firms founded by
entrepreneurs with technical expertise often fall victim to myopia concerning changing
market conditions and their associated technological implications (Burgelman, Maidique
& Wheelwright, 2001). Consequently, technical entrepreneurs frequently persist with their
initial product-market offerings despite evidence of the inadvisability of such actions, as
suggested by the market’s embracing of products based on alternative technology standards.
For example, in 1980 there were dozens of companies offering personal computers with
unique, platform-dependent hardware and/or software configurations. The great majority of
these firms ceased operations when the industry matured and they failed to create new value
propositions consistent with the demands of the market for products based on particular
technology standards (Lawless & Anderson, 1996). In short, the following relationship is
proposed:
Proposition 4c: After the emergence of a new dominant design, small firms, in compari-
son to large firms, are more likely to persist with competing designs resulting in higher firm
failure rates.
Discussion
We have theoretically explored how differences in firm size might explain observed pat-
terns of innovation and associated firm behavior in industries undergoing technological
change. In particular, by pulling from several streams of research (e.g., on alliances and
acquisitions, control systems, and real options) and relying on established concepts (e.g.,
dominant design, technological discontinuity), we have extended the dominant existing
model of technological innovation (as advanced by, for example, Anderson & Tushman,
1990) to explain how small and large firms commonly contribute and adapt to industry-level
technological innovation. The novelty and value added of our paper results from its gener-
ation of an integrated set of propositions that explain the independent and joint actions of
small and large firms relevant to the technological innovation process. A potential side effect
of our relying upon and integrating established theory and concepts is that, individually,
some of our ideas may not appear new. However, we believe that, taken as a whole, our
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observations offer novel insight into how complementary resources among small and large
firms facilitate innovation in dynamic, technology-based industries.
Theoretical, Managerial, and Policy Implications
Our collective observations and arguments have several theoretical implications. For
example, the emergence of collaborative efforts between firms of various sizes may represent
a particularly significant point in an industry’s technology life cycle. Such efforts may signal
the acceptance of a dominant design as well as the prospect of collaborative gains that
increase overall industry attractiveness. Another theoretical implication is that the failure of
many large firms to achieve high levels of innovation may be a predictable result. Given the
strong linkages that seem to exist between innovation-facilitating attributes and firm size,
perhaps it should not be too surprising that even large firms do not often possess a “complete”
set of resources that facilitate progress through all stages of the technological innovation
process. Moreover, the internal creation of a complete set of innovation-facilitating resources
may not, in fact, be the most desirable goal. Real options reasoning suggests that a firm’s
technological innovation interests may be well served by simply maintaining the option to
acquire the promising or proven technologies of others. Collaborative modes of innovation,
where firms leverage partner resources, may represent more efficient paths of technology
progress than internal development when a high technological “learning distance” exists
among firms seeking to create and exploit technological innovations (Hoskisson & Busenitz,
2002).
Several managerial implications also flow from our observations and arguments. First,
managers in firms either confronting or trying to initiate innovation should be receptive
to obtaining from external sources the resources needed to create or exploit technological
innovations. As mentioned above, complete sets of technology- and non-technology-based
resources that facilitate progress through all stages of the technological innovation process
may be uncommon among firms. However, given the “not-invented-here” emphasis that pre-
vails in many firms, managers may not be naturally inclined to augment their firms’ internal
resources with complementary, externally acquired resources. Such a bias may predictably
decrease a firm’s ability to regularly appropriate rents from technological innovations.
Second, managers should consider corporate venturing as a means to create and/or
exploit technological discontinuities. For example, large firms often avoid the bureau-
cratic constraints imposed by their control systems by spinning off entrepreneurial firms
with seed money, while maintaining an interest in the spun-off unit and technology. The
entrepreneurial firm is sometimes then brought back into the parent firm if the prod-
uct/technology is sufficiently attractive to the parent. This approach has proved successful in
facilitating innovation among large firms in Japan (Ito, 1995). Significantly, this “external”
approach to corporate venturing enables the new ventures to benefit from a parenting advan-
tage (Campbell, Goold & Alexander, 1995) and concurrently operate in a more autonomous
fashion outside the purview of the often-stifling corporate control system. Perhaps most
importantly, by engaging in corporate venturing large firms become incubators for new
businesses, thus possibly realizing the innovation-related benefits of large and small firms.
A final managerial implication of our observations and arguments is that managers of
firms in dynamic industries must carefully weigh innovation mode options. Consistent with
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Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) concept of “equifinality,” innovation can result from several
different developmental paths. Firms can innovate through either internal development,
by acquiring the innovative output of others, or through some collaborative arrangement.
Depending upon the specifics of the situation, each of these innovation modes may be
appropriate. The contexts within which each of these innovation modes are optimal have
not been fully specified within the literature; however, research by Hoskisson and Busenitz
(2002), Lengnick-Hall (1991), and Zahra and Covin (1994) has addressed this issue. The
principal challenges for managers may be to recognize that innovation is not always best
accomplished through the same developmental path; to identify criteria that facilitate the
choice of the most appropriate developmental path(s); and to respond accordingly.
From a broader economic perspective, the observations of this paper may also be im-
portant. There are implications for policy makers in the areas of business development and
antitrust. Regarding business development, policy makers must recognize that legislation
that positively affects small firms may have social and economic benefits beyond those firms
due to the symbiotic relationship that often exists between large and small firm resources at
different stages of an industry’ technological evolution. As such, investments in small firms
in the form of tax breaks or government financing programs, for example, may yield particu-
larly high returns. Related to this point, industry-level technology advances from innovation
may be contingent upon having an appropriate mix of large and small firms. This “mix” is
necessary due to the common co-dependence of small and large firms for the purpose of
fully exploiting technological innovations. Although support for small firms is embraced in
the United States, it is less established in other nations. For example, the Japanese Diet first
passed laws promoting the creation of small and medium-size firms in 1999 (METI, 2002).
Regarding antitrust issues, the competitive environment in dynamic, technology-based
industries is different than in more stable industries where critical, advantage-sustaining
resources are sometimes easier to monopolize. Antitrust policy should consider the rate
of observed and anticipated technological change in an industry. The market power of
firms in dynamic, technology-based industries is not just a function of firm size but of the
“completeness” of the firm’s technology- and non-technology-based resources. If, as this pa-
per suggests, firm size is systematically related to the presence of certain innovation-relevant
resources and capabilities whose value (i.e., ability to contribute to the firm’s competitive
strength) is likely to vary across the stages of the technological innovation process, then
larger firms may not be as inherently advantaged in technologically dynamic industries as
in other industries. In short, a more conservative definition of what constitutes a monopoly
situation may be appropriate in dynamic, technology-based industries where large size may
not confer lasting competitive advantages.
Limitations and Future Research
Several limitations are inherent to our theory development and propositions, and ap-
propriate qualifications should be acknowledged. Three qualifications are, perhaps, most
noteworthy. First, the collaborative efforts between large and small firms discussed in our
paper are not inevitable but simply possible arrangements through which technology ad-
vances might be made. Certainly many small firms innovate and grow without the direct
collaborative involvement of large firms, and vice versa. Second, our arguments rely on
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several generalizations concerning the resources and attributes typical of large and small
firms. The predictive accuracy of our propositions will likely be a function of whether the
specific firms in question have the assumed types of resources and attributes. Third, our
discussion does not depict the complexity or full variety of possible associations between
the key variables used to build the propositions. For example, our discussion does not ad-
dress why some industries continue to operate with competing technology standards while
others quickly converge around a single dominant design.
Various directions for future research are suggested by the preceding discussion. First,
and most obviously, our propositions are offered for empirical verification. Future studies
could test the predictive validity of these propositions. Longitudinal data and methods of
analysis through which causation could be inferred would be needed since the passage
of time is an inherent aspect of the propositions. Second, future research might produc-
tively focus on more fully delineating the determinants of effective large firm–small firm
collaborative efforts. While some progress has been reported in this area (e.g., Eisenhardt
& Schoonhoven, 1996; Hitt et al., 2001; Harrison et al., 2001), many fundamental un-
certainties remain regarding why alliances assume certain forms, how and what parties
contribute to alliances, and the effects of alliances and acquisition activity on performance.
Additionally, while the current paper presented a resource-based justification for firm collab-
orations, non-resource-based explanations of collaborative efforts—including, for example,
the effects of managerial opportunism, governance structure choices, and expectations of
collaborating firms—may be equally (or more) valid and, thus, represent promising opportu-
nities for future research. Finally, investigations into the means firms choose to appropriate
rents from technological discontinuities represent a particularly promising and important
research domain. Two broad and significant research questions might include: (1) What or-
ganizational, environmental, and strategic factors differentiate firms that effectively exploit
technological discontinuities from those that do not? and (2) Under what circumstances do
collaborative arrangements between firms facilitate or impede the appropriation of rents
from technological discontinuities?
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